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In Defense of Intellectual Property Anxiety: A Response to Professor
Fagundes

Aaron Perzanowski
Abstract: In this Response to Professor Fagundes’s "Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain,"
Professor Perzanowski expresses skepticism about two assumptions underlying the argument for
embracing property rhetoric to promote the public domain. This argument assumes, first, public
recognition of social discourse theory as an account of property and, second, rhetorical
advantages of social discourse theory that are comparable to those of more familiar notions of
private property. Perzanowski concludes that the simple intuitive appeal of Blackstonian property
cautions against styling the struggle for balanced copyright and patent policy as a debate over
competing property interests.

Response

In Defense of Intellectual Property
Anxiety: A Response to Professor
Fagundes
Aaron K. Perzanowski†
In Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain, David Fagundes offers a powerfully descriptive account of the role the
rhetoric of property has played—and failed to play—in shaping
copyright and patent policy.1 As he explains, rights holders have
embraced property talk, harnessing its moral and rhetorical
force to great effect. In recent decades, Congress and the courts
have set copyright and patent protection on a trajectory of increasing breadth and length, often justifying those expansions
in the language of property rights.2
Commentators critical of this trend have attempted to undermine the force of property rhetoric by challenging the notion
that traditional conceptions of property map onto exclusive
rights in intangibles. Fagundes refers to this resistance to the
equation of intellectual property exclusivity and traditional
property rights as property anxiety.3 This anxiety, he argues,
has led to missed opportunities to divert copyright and patent
policy from the errant path of expansionism. Prescriptively, Fagundes suggests that, rather than distance copyright and patent
law from property, advocates of the public domain and user
rights should appropriate property talk as a means to tap into
its rhetorical power and counter expansionist arguments.4
† Assistant Professor, Wayne State University Law School. My thanks
to David Fagundes for his comments. Copyright © 2010 by Aaron K. Perzanowski.
1. David Fagundes, Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain, 94 MINN.
L. REV. 652 (2010).
2. See, e.g., MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913,
961 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[D]eliberate unlawful copying is no less an unlawful taking of property than garden-variety theft.”).
3. Fagundes, supra note 1, at 667–72.
4. Id. at 705.
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But this rhetorical jujitsu requires us to reevaluate our
understanding of property. According to Fagundes, advocates of
expansive intellectual property rights and those suffering from
property anxiety share a preoccupation with an absolutist
Blackstonian notion of property, one that focuses on the unassailable dominion exercised by the property owner.5 Intellectual
property expansionists adopt this romantic caricature of property, and the anxious accept it as their target.
Fagundes points to another property tradition, the social
discourse of property, and argues that it more accurately describes the dynamics of intellectual property and lends a rhetorical upper hand to friends of the public domain. The social
discourse of property recognizes a complex system of social relations that accounts for diverse and overlapping interests. Rather than focusing exclusively on private property, the social
discourse perspective values commons and public property
models as well. By framing arguments against expansion in
terms of protecting public property, Fagundes envisions a
proactive rhetorical strategy that articulates a positive account
of the value of limiting IP rights, instead of merely chipping
away at the foundations of the expansionist arguments.
I am deeply sympathetic to Fagundes’s project and largely
concur in his descriptive account. I agree that the simple intuitive rhetoric of Blackstonian property is a powerful tool that
those of us who favor greater balance in the intellectual property system have yet to match. Likewise, I am persuaded that the
social discourse account is a better descriptive fit for copyright
and patent exclusivity than property absolutism. Perhaps most
importantly, I recognize the normative pull generated by characterizing the public domain as a set of affirmative rights held by
the public rather than a mere absence of rights.6 This framing
encourages a sense of ownership and responsibility for our
shared cultural and scientific repository and confronts efforts to
denigrate the public domain as a lightless chasm into which
condemned works are cast.7
5. Id. at 675.
6. These are just two of many ways in which we can define the public
domain. See Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse on Public Domains, 55
DUKE L.J. 783 (2006) (discussing thirteen distinct definitions of the public domain).
7. The common phrase “falling into the public domain” suggests something regrettable. Characteristically, Jack Valenti put it in even starker
terms: “A public domain work is an orphan. No one is responsible for its life.
But everyone exploits its use, until that time certain when it becomes soiled
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Despite these points of fundamental agreement, I count
myself among the anxious. This anxiety reflects skepticism
about two assumptions underlying the argument in favor of
embracing social discourse property rhetoric. First, the argument assumes the relevant audiences will recognize social discourse as an account of property. Second, it assumes the social
discourse account will yield the many rhetorical advantages of
private property talk. Both of those assumptions deserve closer
examination. Ultimately, I maintain that social discourse lacks
the intuitive appeal of the oversimplified understanding of private property that accounts for the force property rhetoric.
I. SOCIAL DISCOURSE AND POPULAR NOTIONS OF
PROPERTY
The argument for a shift to property rhetoric depends first
on the recognition of social discourse as a legitimate description
of what we talk about when we talk about property. To prove
effective, social discourse rhetoric must appeal to a number of
audiences. And the receptiveness of each of those audiences to
the social discourse account of property is likely to vary substantially.
Ultimately, Fagundes aims to recast our understanding of
property. But the public is not the only relevant audience in
that effort. Scholars and courts play an important, if indirect,
role in shaping our attitudes about property.
The task of convincing academics that social discourse is
an account of property is a manageable one. The social discourse approach, even if not the dominant paradigm, boasts a
long history and established theoretical justifications.8
But as the comparison of Kelo9 and Eldred10 and their respective public reactions suggest, scholars are not the most important audience.11 Courts are one of the primary targets of the
rhetorical power of property. Even at the highest levels of the
judiciary, the allure of Blackstonian oversimplification remains
and haggard, barren of its previous virtues.” Copyright Term, Film Labeling,
and Film Preservation Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 989, H.R. 1248, and H.R.
1734 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 55 (1995) (statement of Jack Valenti, President
and CEO, Motion Picture Association of America).
8. See Fagundes, supra note 1, at 677–83.
9. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
10. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
11. See Fagundes, supra note 1, at 653–57.
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strong.12 Nonetheless, courts are a promising audience for social discourse rhetoric. Like legal academics, judges have a relatively high tolerance for nuance and possess the sophistication
necessary to internalize the notion of property as a complex of
social relations.
As Eldred makes all too clear, however, the ultimate arbiter of the fate of the public domain is Congress, a body far less
concerned with the intricacies of the choice between property
romanticism and social discourse.13 Equally importantly, Congress faces strong incentives, in the form of well-funded and
well-organized lobbies, to remain persuaded by the private
property rhetoric of rights holders.14
Presumably, even congressional inertia will respond to sufficient numbers of vocal voters. The shift to a rhetoric of social
discourse is most likely to succeed, therefore, if it can convince
a substantial portion of the public that “property” encompasses
not only familiar notions of private ownership but also an interrelated web of social relationships. At some level, social discourse is consistent with common understandings of property.
We generally accept some restrictions on the use of private
property for the benefit of the larger community.15 The open
question, however, is whether a model broad enough to contain
the public domain and user rights in copyrighted and patented
works is one the average citizen would recognize as property.
Putting aside the question of whether we can expect the public
to internalize the many nuances of social discourse theory, I
remain unconvinced that the public will recognize the claims
that flow from social discourse as claims about property interests. We should give careful consideration to the magnitude of
the gap between the prevailing public understanding of property and social discourse before we attempt to bridge it.
II. THE RHETORICAL FORCE OF SOCIAL DISCOURSE
This brings us to the second assumption implicit in the
case for social discourse: rhetoric. Presuming courts, Congress,
12. Id. at 661–62 (noting Justice Scalia’s invocation of property romanticism during oral argument in eBay v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006)).
13. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 204 (noting the Court’s substantial deference to
Congress’s determination of the appropriate duration of copyright protection).
14. Indeed, in the copyright context, rights holders and their representatives have traditionally served as the primary drafters of copyright legislation.
See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 22–25 (2001).
15. Nuisance laws offer perhaps the most familiar example. See Fagundes, supra note 1, at 682.
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and the public acknowledge social discourse as property, the
argument in favor of property talk assumes that the social discourse model brings to bear the same rhetorical force as property absolutism. If the public outcry over Kelo and the success of
IP expansionism are a function of the rhetorical power of property generally, then this is a safe assumption. But a number of
considerations suggest that the power of property rhetoric is
deeply intertwined with a romantic vision of private property.
If this is the case, then the rhetorical power of property talk
may not transfer to rhetoric cast in social discourse.
As Fagundes notes, the rhetoric of private property is simple.16 Stealing the property of another is wrong. This pithy
maxim provides property absolutism with an intuitive and immediately comprehensible rationale. By comparison, the social
discourse model of property cannot make the same claim to
simplicity. Treating works as public property after their copyrights expire has some intuitive resonance. But the notion that
under some circumstances fair use or the idea/expression distinction renders aspects of protected works public property
lacks the intuitive moral force of private ownership. Part of
what is so powerful about property rhetoric is its ability to construct a simple caricature of the complexities of the property relationship. Social discourse sacrifices that simplicity for accuracy, diluting its rhetorical force as a result.
The interests advocated through social discourse rhetoric
are also diffuse. The rhetorical punch of private property talk
derives, in part, from the concentrated interests at stake. The
deprivation of property in Kelo was felt acutely by a handful of
property owners. Likewise, when copyright or patent protection
expires, the rights holder can point to concentrated economic
losses. Harms to the public domain, on the other hand, are distributed broadly across society. This fact does not lessen the
magnitude of these harms, but it does give us reason to suspect
the public consciousness will be less aroused by a shrinking
public domain.
The public outcry over the closure of public parks offers a
helpful counterpoint.17 If citizens are willing to take to the
streets, or at least e-mail their representatives, over the loss of
public parks, why not the public domain? This question points
to another distinction between the rhetorics of private property
16. Id. at 691.
17. Id. at 699.
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and social discourse: the interests advocated by private property talk are typically concrete. In the minds of the public, the
loss of tangible property entails palpable consequences. Given
the centrality of land to notions of freedom and security, we are
particularly sensitive to harms arising from losses of real property.
But Fagundes argues that intangible rights can create
equally strong attachments, noting that authors and inventors
express deep connections to their creations.18 In this sense,
creators are as deeply invested in their works as the family
farmer is in his land. But society’s interest in the public domain
is far more abstract. To be clear, the public domain offers immense value. It provides raw material necessary for future
creativity and innovation,19 it lowers prices for copies of existing works, and it increases their availability.20 For the average
citizen, however, these benefits are simply not as immediate as
more familiar interests in tangible property.
Fagundes responds to worries about the abstract and diffuse nature of our interest in the public domain by pointing to
the controversy surrounding the efforts of the American Society
of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP) to prevent unlicensed Girl Scout sing-a-longs of popular music.21 This example is instructive because it suggests that interests in the public
domain can motivate strong public sentiment. As an initial
matter, however, I am not convinced that the public reaction to
ASCAP is best understood in terms of defending public property. Although the Girls Scouts mistakenly believed the songs
were in the public domain, the public did not necessarily share
that belief. The widespread hostility to ASCAP is just as easily
explained as a condemnation of its decision to assert admittedly
valid rights against a nonprofit youth organization.
Even accepting the defense of the public domain as the motivation for popular opposition to ASCAP, the Girl Scouts example appears to be the exception that proves the rule. The interests at stake were both concentrated and concrete. The Girl
Scouts wanted to sing Puff the Magic Dragon around the camp18. Id. at 696–97.
19. See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990)
(describing the role the public domain plays in enabling future creativity).
20. Dennis S. Karjala, Does Information Beget Information?, 2007 DUKE
L. & TECH. REV. 1, 19 (2007) (“The public domain has real economic value to
the public in that works no longer subject to copyright are generally more
broadly available and for a lower price.”).
21. See Fagundes, supra note 1, at 697–98.
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fire, and ASCAP demanded they pay for the privilege. As a result, a concrete and concentrated harm was inflicted. If property rhetoric was at work, it succeeded because these facts
avoided the pitfalls of abstraction and diffusion that generally
work against the rhetoric of social discourse.22
One final feature of property romanticism that gives it a
rhetorical advantage over a social discourse account of the public domain is the popular conception that property entails enduring ownership. Property remains in the possession of its
owner until that owner willingly parts with it, even in the face
of competing public concerns. Kelo sparked such vocal public
reactions largely because it offended this basic precept of the
common understanding of property. Copyright holders, much
like the plaintiffs in Kelo, are sympathetic when viewed
through the potentially distorting lens of property rhetoric. The
public domain demands that they surrender exclusive control
over their property in the name of some broader social purpose,
the value of which may be poorly understood by rights holders
and the public generally. If Kelo’s aftermath teaches us anything, it is that this sort of unwilling transfer offends common
sensibilities about property. Overcoming those sensibilities is
no small task for social discourse rhetoric.
CONCLUSION
In the end, my anxiety grows out of my belief that a debate
framed in terms of property rhetoric inevitably tilts the balance
in favor of expansionism. Social discourse offers the virtues of
accuracy and nuance. But as a rhetorical tool aimed at society
generally, the simple intuitive force of property romanticism
yields an undeniable, almost gravitational pull. The shift to
property rhetoric forces a choice between the concentrated
property interests of the author or inventor—themselves the
subject of romantic notions of genius23—and the diffuse and abstract interests of society in the public domain. Ultimately, I
lack confidence that given such a choice, the relevant audiences
will choose wisely.
22. In this sense, the Girl Scouts example could provide a model for effective social discourse rhetoric. It must identify a discrete harm felt by a particular group, ideally a sympathetic one. The question is whether that model can
be applied generally to the interests implicated by the public domain.
23. See James D.A. Boyle, The Search for an Author: Shakespeare and the
Framers, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 625, 632–43 (1988); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory
of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship”, 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 455–63
(1991).
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But Fagundes is quite right that those of us who favor
more limited IP regimes need a simple and powerful positive
account that presents the preservation and expansion of the
public domain as a natural consequence of deeply held commitments. Property anxiety is not such an account. It counters
property talk but is not itself a rhetorical alternative. Advocates of a robust public domain, however, can draw on other
rhetorical frames.
The rhetoric of contract, while admittedly not new and arguably not successful, is one such alternative.24 The notion that
copyright and patent grants represent a quid pro quo, whereby
creators are granted temporary exclusivity in exchange for disclosing or publishing25 works that contribute to the public domain, is both descriptively accurate and rhetorically forceful.26
Just as we all intuitively acknowledge the sanctity of property,
we recognize the moral imperative of a promise. Contract rhetoric strikes at the same notion of fairness that gives property
absolutism its persuasive force. But rather than balancing public property interests against private ones, contract rhetoric escapes the pull of private property romanticism by supplanting
property rhetoric altogether.
Perhaps the only accurate measure of rhetorical merit
emerges through practice. If so, time may well prove my anxiety unjustified. Regardless of the ultimate prospects of property
talk, Property Rhetoric and the Public Domain highlights the
24. In Eldred, the Court accepted the basic proposition that the copyright
represented a quid pro quo. The Court, however, concluded that the “this” received by the copyright holder included both the current term of protection as
well as any subsequent extensions. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 214 –15
(2003).
25. L. Ray Patterson, Copyright Overextended: A Preliminary Inquiry Into
the Need for a Federal Statute of Unfair Competition, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV.
385, 392 (1992) (noting that after the Copyright Act of 1976, federal copyright
law no longer required publication as part of the quid pro quo of copyright protection).
26. See, e.g., James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87, 106 (1997) (describing fair use as part of
the implicit quid pro quo of copyright); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the
Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1017, 1022 (1989) (noting judicial characterizations of the enabling disclosure
of a patent as the quid pro quo of patent exclusivity); Pamela Samuelson,
CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663, 705–06 (1984) (describing the contribution of “new ideas into the public domain [as] the quid pro
quo the public received in exchange for the limited monopoly right the author received”).
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pressing need for advocates of more moderate IP policy to focus
on crafting arguments that appeal not only to courts, but to the
public as well.

